Cindy Low, Kate Goodchild, Luke Dorsett, and Roozi Araghi perished on Dreamworld’s Thunder River Rapids ride on the Gold Coast on October 25, 2016. The incident wasn’t subtle. It was the kind of catastrophic failure that reveals the extent to which a regulatory system had subtly lagged behind the reality it was meant to control.
After years of audits, reviews, and coronial inquests, Queensland’s Amusement Devices Code of Practice 2023 was finally released in early 2024. The document, which offers helpful advice on controlling health and safety hazards for amusement rides throughout the state, is dry reading. However, what lies behind it is anything but dry.
Many people were affected by a government review that was commissioned soon after the tragedy: operating a forklift in Queensland required a high-risk work licence. Running a ride that could propel hundreds of passengers through the air quickly didn’t. On the surface, that comparison seemed almost ridiculous, but it ended up serving as a metaphor for how disjointed the previous framework had been.
58 recommendations—a comprehensive set of modifications addressing licensing, inspections, operator training, and enforcement capability—were found in the 2017 best practice review. One of the most startling discoveries was that some of the rides at school functions and local shows were over thirty years old and had never undergone a thorough inspection. “Poor mechanical integrity and lack of modern safety control measures” were identified as a major concern in the review. A significant portion of the 111 serious incidents that occurred on Australian rides between 2001 and 2016 were attributed to operator error or insufficient training.
Industrial manslaughter laws, which carry maximum penalties of 20 years in prison for individuals and $10 million fines for corporate offenders, were implemented in Queensland. Minister Grace stated at the time that businesses would not be able to evade accountability by hiding behind complex corporate structures. This was a pointed statement from the government.
The generous framing may have contributed to the measured pace of regulatory reform. It took over seven years after Dreamworld’s demise for the Amusement Devices Code of Practice 2023 to be released. Stricter record-keeping regulations, more precise risk categories for operators ranging from large theme parks to traveling carnivals, and mandatory major inspections by qualified engineers every ten years are all new. The code fills in the practical gaps left by the previous system and is intended to supplement rather than replace current workplace health and safety laws.
Observing all of this, it seems like it took years of public scrutiny and the weight of four deaths for Queensland to actually address a regulatory blind spot that it had likely sensed existed. The 2017 review found that funding had actually decreased and that the number of field inspectors had not kept up with the state’s expanding working population, making it more difficult for Workplace Health and Safety Queensland to carry out its duties effectively.
The actual Dreamworld has advanced. With the announcement of new rides and development plans in recent years, the park has grown. The Thunder River Rapids location has long since vanished. However, Queensland’s ride safety culture has changed in ways that are at least more open about the risks involved, including who is in charge, what credentials they need, and how frequently equipment needs to be disassembled and inspected.
Whether the 2023 code closes all of the gaps found by the coronial inquest is still up for debate. On paper, regulatory frameworks often seem complete, but in reality, they are often lacking. The fact that the baseline has shifted is less controversial. Now, the question is whether Queensland’s ability to enforce the law has changed along with it.
